

Threat Modeling: Concepts and Actions

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Intro: Why do we do this?

- Analyze our attack surface
- Analyze our adversaries
- Implement security controls
- Test security controls
- Feed our Intelligence Lifecycle

Different Types of Threat Actor

Actor	Target
State-Sponsored Actor	Any and every computer
Organized Cybercriminals	Enterprises
Hactivists	Government entities, corporations, individuals
Lone Wolf	Financial Institutions and their networks

Dispelling Notions

- We have the answers to criticality in your enterprise
 - BCDRs which lead to BIAs are essential
- We are not unique
 - From the eyes of an adversary, attack vectors maintain across enterprises.
- We are asking the wrong questions
- This is a technical problem that has to be solved


Priority Intelligence Requirements

- Must be specific; only answer one question
- Should focus on a single act or activity
- Should support a single decision

Generic Example: “What are the threats targeting financial institutions”

Specific Example: “What critical remote access technologies for financial institutions have been attacked in the past 4 months”

Building our Threat Model



Threat Modeling

1. Scope Definition

- a) Gather Information
- b) Demarcate Perimeter Boundary

2. System Decomposition

- a) Identify system components
- b) Draw how data flows
- c) Divide trust boundaries


3. Threat Identification

- a) Identify threat vectors
- b) List Threat Events

4. Attack Modeling

- a) Map sequence of attack
- b) Describe TTPs
- c) Generate Threat Scenarios

The Modified Intelligence Lifecycle



Enrichment with Threat Intelligence

- Creating a Collection Plan
 - Telemetry, Darknets/Honeypots, Tailored Feeds, Dumps, HUMINT, Paste Bins, News and Media platforms
- Utilize non-technical intelligence
 - Understanding geopolitical trends in areas where attacks may be launched
- Determine what networks require further hardening
 - i.e. DDOS attack prevention due to increased reporting
- Prioritize which vulnerabilities should be addressed in order of probability and severity of exploitation
- Dark Web Monitoring

Applying the Concepts

Threat Modeling for the:



Business Impacts

1.Theft

2.Operational Costs

a. Customer turnover

b. Costs System downtime (Ransomware)

c. Costs related to acquiring new business


1.Fines

2.Reputational Damage

3.Contractual

Attack Surface Analysis

1. Remote access gateways
2. Remote Employees
3. Web App
4. WiFi Access point
5. Back Office Employees
6. Web App Databases
7. Gateways to Third Party Networks



Framing the Impact

- Based on likelihood and severity

Impact	Likelihood	Severity
Corruption or destruciton of information systems	4	3
Data leakage/exfiltration	2	8
Interruption of technical operations	6	4
Fines and Penalties	4	3
Lost market share	4	8
Brand damage	3	9
Loss of trade licenses	2	9
Breach of Contract	1	5
Supply Chain Disruption		8

Building Our Threat Model

Threat Modeling

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
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
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



Adversarial Analysis

- Dark Web reporting indicated APT 25/Vixen Panda/Sushi Roll is actively targeting critical infrastructure in the Mid-Atlantic
 - In addition to being critical infrastructure, East Northeast Wilmington Bank conducts business with the Transportation System, Communications, and Critical Manufacturing Sectors
- Historical reporting indicates that APT25 exploits vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure VPN, which the East Northeast Wilmington Bank utilizes.
<https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4330/nickel-targeting-organizations-across-europe-north-america-and-south-america>
- Additionally, they have used phishing attacks, and probe remote access endpoints as a way to gain initial access to the network.

Adversarial Analysis







Putting our Threat Model to Action

1. Security Mitigations

1. Properly segment networks
2. Eradicate lines of communication between segments
3. Ensure persistent logs and sensor placement on hosts as well as networked architecture
4. Drop traffic to known Ips and domains associated with APT 25

2. Threat Hunting

1. Observe VPN logs
2. Observe Exchange Server logs
3. Analyze authentication failures, and rapid authentications in a short time
4. Focus on gateways into the network where client aided attacks may take place


3. Adversarial Emulation

1. Emulated phishing attacks
2. Automate SQL injection attacks
3. Red Team engagement against VPN gateways
4. Security Assessments / Vulnerability assessment against externally facing entities
5. Test for possibility of API misuse in Web App and Enterprise Application

4. Architecture

1. Audit current systems; search for hidden remote end points i.e. test websites; unused accounts
2. Remove local admin rights and review password policy
3. Require MFA for remote and on-site employees

Feeding The Intelligence Lifecycle



- PIRs
 1. Phished emails with similar remote access attachment
 2. Wide spread failed authentication attempts using dumped passwords
 3. Firewall logging anomalous TCP/IP traffic originating from inside the trusted network
- Sources
 - Internal: WAF Logs, Web Application Logs, Endpoint Security, Router Logs, VPN Logs, Vulnerability Scans
 - External: Threat Data Feeds, Paste Bins, Dark Web, HUMINT
- Data is collected, filtered, organized, and delivered to a common repository for analysis
- Analysis is conducted to confirm or deny the validity of our security controls, threat assumptions, and logging
- Analysis will uncover if we need to modify our PIRs and/or sources